This paper assesses the application of the nascent corporate opportunity doctrine in China by comparison with its well-established English counterpart; in particular, it evaluates whether the fine balance between business integrity and business efficiency has been struck. It is argued that the scope of application of the corporate opportunity doctrine in China should be extended and the rules on the burden of proof should be amended. Moreover, a stricter approach should be adopted by the Chinese judiciary for the purpose of protecting the company's interests and enhancing business integrity.
Introduction
The corporate opportunity doctrine has existed in the United Kingdom for a long period of examines recent cases and analyses the standards which have been used by Chinese judiciary in determining whether the corporate opportunity doctrine has been breached. It is concluded that the introduction of corporate opportunity doctrine in China is of great significance in enhancing directors' duties and improving the protection of the company's interests; however, the current rules need to be reformed in order to strike a proper balance between maintaining business integrity and enhancing business efficiency. The scope of application of the doctrine is narrow and the judiciary has adopted a relaxed attitude towards directors' misconduct; it can be argued that the current rules favour enhancing business efficiency over maintaining business integrity. It is proposed that its scope of application needs to be broadened and the circumstances where corporate opportunity is abused should be more clearly defined.
Moreover, the power of authorisation should be granted to the board of directors in addition to the shareholder meeting.
The corporate opportunity doctrine in England
In England, directors were under the duties to avoid conflicts of interests (no-conflict rule)
and not to make secret profits from their positions (no secret profit rule) at common law. The courts traditionally have taken a strict approach in applying these rules 2 . In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 3 it was held that the directors should return the profits to the company because they had obtained their profits by reason and in the course of the execution of their office as It was held that Cooley breached the no secret profit rule and he was liable to account as information came to him while he was a managing director of the company. This strict approach could deter directors from pursuing their own interests at the expense of the company; nevertheless, it has been strongly criticised by Lowry & Edmunds as being too harsh on directors and it unduly curbs entrepreneurial freedom to compete with companies 5 .
These no-conflict and no-profit rules are now codified in Section 175 of the Companies Act
2006
, which provides that a director must "avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict with the interests of the company". Section 175 also applies to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of it. This approach aims to prevent directors from pursuing their own interests at the expense of their company.
Compared with the strict English approach, a more relaxed and flexible approach to the corporate opportunity doctrine is adopted in other common law jurisdictions such as Canada required to do whilst the courts and judges found it difficult to enforce these duties in practice. 21 The CCL 2005 has not resolved these inadequacies to any great extent. Directors now owe a duty of loyalty to the company and they must comply with laws, administrative regulations and the articles of association. 22 It is argued that the duty of loyalty, although similar to the concept of fiduciary duty in England, is not clearly defined in China; further judicial interpretations are required to clarify the meaning and the scope of this duty.
The duty of diligence is of great importance for the protection of the interests of shareholders and the company. As directors have discretion to propose business strategies and prepare reports for shareholder meetings, the lack of this duty may easily lead to their misuse of has taken on the office of director, taking into account of the functions undertaken. The latter sets a subjective standard in relation to the personal attributes of the director, which may in some circumstances raise the objective minimum standard.
More detailed guidance is provided at common law on the duty of care, skill and diligence. In
Re Barings Plc (No.5) 32 , a number of senior directors failed to supervise a rogue trader within the bank, which resulted in a substantial amount of financial loss and the collapse of the bank.
These directors were found to be unfit and disqualified. It was held that directors, both collectively and individually, had a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge of the company's business to enable them to discharge their duties. Whilst directors, subject to the articles of association, are entitled to delegate particular functions to those below them in the management chain and to trust their competence and integrity to a reasonable extent, the delegation of power does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated functions. It is argued that the English approach, which combines objective and subjective standards for this duty, will be of great benefit to Chinese legislators because it has been well established and tested in practice over a long period of time. A senior manager is defined as "deputy-manager, finance manager and the director's secretary at listed companies, or others specified in the company's articles of association." Another question arises as to whether the corporate opportunity doctrine applies to directors or senior managers who have retired or left the company. In England, a director continues to be subject to the duty to avoid conflict of interests in relation to company property, information or opportunity after he ceases his appointment. 44 A director is therefore prevented from taking advantage of a situation by simply resigning from the company's board of directors. Jiang strongly argues that the same approach should be followed in China (3) Should the corporate opportunity doctrine apply to controlling shareholders?
It is clear that the fiduciary duties in Art 149 do not apply to controlling shareholders.
Controlling shareholders are defined as those who hold more than 50% of the company's share capital and those who have a great influence on the outcome of shareholder resolution even though they do not hold a majority of shares of the company 55 . It is important to impose some restrictions on controlling shareholders' conduct in China, not least for the protection of minority shareholders' interests. This is particularly significant due to the shareholding structure in many companies which are controlled by majority shareholders. The shareholding structure is highly concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders in most joint stock companies, even in listed companies. 56 Shareholders were generally free to act in their own interests and owed no fiduciary duties to other shareholders or the company under the CCL 1993. 57 Majority shareholders' interests may be consistent with those of the minority but practical evidence suggests the former may try to take advantage of their controlling position, in particular, in large joint stock companies. 58 A restriction on their conduct therefore is essential to prevent their abuse of power and thereby protect the interests of minority shareholders and the company.
Under the CCL 2005, shareholders, including controlling shareholders, must exercise their voting rights according to law. They must not abuse their rights which would infringe the interests of the company or other shareholders; otherwise, they will be held liable for compensation to the company or shareholders. 59 Specifically, Art 21 stipulates that a company's controlling shareholders, de facto controllers 60 , directors, supervisors or senior managers shall not use their affiliated relationship to harm the interests of the company. They will be responsible for compensation if this provision is breached. The duties of controlling shareholders therefore have been strengthened to tackle the serious de facto control problems and to ease their oppression against minority shareholders. These provisions, however, are very general and difficult to apply in practice; for example, the duties in Articles 20 and 21
are not specified and the only remedy available is compensation.
In prove the defendant (who was a senior manager of the claimant) was conducting the same business as that of the claimant 75 . It is concluded from the judgments of these cases that the claimant company bears the burden of proof, which makes it even more difficult to hold the defendants liable for the breach of their fiduciary duties. It would be helpful if the test of liability based on presumed fault could be adopted in some circumstances so that the defendants are presumed to be liable unless they can prove otherwise.
It can be argued that the Chinese judiciary has adopted a less rigid approach to corporate opportunity compared to the English counterpart. In Beijing proper balance between business morality and business efficiency.
Conclusion
It is a great step forward by introducing the corporate opportunity doctrine into directors' fiduciary duties in China; however, the current rules merely provide a basic legal framework and they are insufficient to deter directors from seizing corporate opportunities for their personal interests. In terms of the scope of application, it only applies to directors and senior managers; supervisors and controlling shareholders are not covered by this duty. Moreover, the concept of director does not take into account de facto directors and shadow directors. It is recommended that, in order to maximize the protection for a company's interests, the scope of application should be extended and that the classification of different types of directors under English law should be considered for its introduction into Chinese law.
In relation to authorisation, only a shareholder meeting can approve the use of corporate opportunities by directors and senior managers in China. This may be impractical and inefficient as the procedure for holding such meeting is cumbersome and lengthy. It is argued that the board of directors should be entitled to authorise the actual and potential conflict of interests and the use of corporate opportunities. The different requirements for authorisation in private companies and public companies under English law should be considered for future
Chinese legislation reforms.
The narrow scope of application of the corporate opportunity doctrine, the heavy burden of proof on the claimant company and the relaxed approach adopted by the judiciary indicate that the current balance leans towards promoting business efficiency in China. Recent cases also demonstrate that the courts are tolerant towards the behaviours of directors and senior managers; they are reluctant to hold directors' liable and keen to ensure that corporate opportunities are used. As such, the business integrity of directors and senior managers is not strictly maintained. It is argued that the current tolerance of directors' misconduct and the encouragement of directors to make full use of business opportunities stem partially from the country's drive to increase economic performance and partially from the lack of detailed statutory rules as well as the inexperience or incompetence of the judges. In order to enhance both the business efficiency and business integrity in the long run, it is strongly recommended that the current balance should be re-addressed and more emphasis should be placed on maintaining business integrity. In particular, the scope of application of the corporate opportunity doctrine should be expanded and the burden of proof should not entirely be placed on the claimant company. Moreover, a stricter judicial attitude should be adopted for the purpose of protecting the company's interests and enhancing business integrity.
